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A REPLY TO PROFESSOR REVESZ’S





In a recent symposium article,1 Professor Richard Revesz pays
me the tremendous compliment of responding to my own article.2  I
had challenged his ultimate conclusion that the “race-to-the-bottom”
rationale for federal environmental regulation is not valid.3  Unfortu-
nately, his response to my article fails to comprehend the arguments
that I advanced.  I write to set the record straight and to invite fur-
ther discussion.
In Part I below, I explain why I did not argue that the mere exis-
tence of preemptive federal legislation justifies its own existence.  In-
stead, my article described how federal environmental regulation
may appear justified if preemptive federal legislation reflects proper
measures of value, and may appear unjustified when different meas-
ures of value are applied.  Under our constitutional system, oppo-
nents of existing federal environmental legislation bear the burden of
proving that such legislation is unjustified.  Nevertheless, I discussed
in my article two independent measures of value that could support
federal environmental regulation.
In Part II, I respond to three specific challenges posed by Profes-
sor Revesz to my arguments for federal environmental regulation.
* Of Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP; formerly Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Arizona; previously in practice with Covington & Burling and the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency; Clerk to Hon. Irving L. Goldberg, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
(deceased); J.D., Stanford University, 1986; B.S., M.I.T., 1981.  I am grateful for the continuing
contributions of Professor Revesz to these issues.
1. Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A
Response To Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997).
2. Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective)
for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997).
3. See id. at 278-85.  Professor Revesz originally addressed the “race-to-the-bottom” ra-
tionale in his article Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom”
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).  Professor
Revesz does not address my criticism (and substantial support) of his later work on interstate
externalities.  Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); see Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 269-78.
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Specifically, I explain: (A) why I believe interstate ideologic exter-
nalities are significant, even if measured in the way proposed by Pro-
fessor Revesz; (B) how I acknowledge the validity of preemptive
maximum standards; and (C) why I consider pervasive federal regula-
tion to be justified, even though I believe that particular federal envi-
ronmental laws are inefficient and unconstitutional.
I.  DETERMINING WHETHER PREEMPTIVE FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IS JUSTIFIED
In my article, I distinguished between “national evaluative
norms” and “state-level values;” that is, between the collective values
of the citizens of the entire country (as expressed in preemptive fed-
eral legislation) and the collective values of the citizens of particular
states.4  I then explained why the five traditional rationales for fed-
eral regulation may appear theoretically valid assuming that national
evaluative norms reflect proper measures of value.  These rationales
are: (1) obtaining “economies-of-scale” in standard-setting, imple-
mentation, and enforcement; (2) limiting interstate “externalities” of
physical pollution, economic losses, and ideological harms; (3) pre-
venting states from suboptimally lowering their environmental stan-
dards in response to interstate competition to attract industry (the
“race-to-the-bottom”); (4) remedying the “under-representation” of
environmental interests in state political processes; and (5) imposing
moral “rights” to environmental quality.  I also discussed why these
rationales may  not appear valid if federal regulation is evaluated on
the basis of state-level values.5
A.  Circularity and The Burden Of Proof
Professor Revesz does not appear to dispute that the collective
values of the nation’s citizens differ from the collective values of par-
ticular states’ citizens.  Nor does he address my arguments that are
based on this difference, with three exceptions that I address below.6
Instead, he takes issue with my definition of “national evaluative
4. Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 232 n.18, 243.
5. Id. at 251-91.
6. Curiously, Professor Revesz does not even acknowledge my argument that, under par-
ticular conditions, preemptive federal regulation increases social welfare by preventing the
very possibility of a race-to-the-bottom.  Such regulation is warranted whenever the risks of
incrementally suboptimal state regulatory responses to competition (as measured by national
evaluative norms) exceed the perceived benefits of preserving state regulatory autonomy (i.e.,
of promoting normative diversity).  See id. at 278-85.
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norms”7: “the measures of value implicitly adopted when preemptive
federal legislation is enacted.”8
Specifically, he challenges as having a “troubling circularity”9 my
argument that federal regulation is more likely to increase social wel-
fare than is state or local regulation when national evaluative norms
are applied.10  “Given this definition, it would appear that every fed-
eral regulation would be desirable from the standpoint of a ‘national
evaluative norm.’  Otherwise, presumably, state law would not have
been preempted.”11  Consequently, my “formulation does not provide
any independent metric by which to judge when federal regulation is
desirable.”12
I agree.  But I did not intend to use the term “national evaluative
norms” to provide an “independent metric” to judge whether federal
regulation is desirable.  Instead, my point was to contrast national
evaluative norms with state-level values and to demonstrate how the
social-welfare effects of federal environmental regulation appear to
vary with the political jurisdiction that specifies the applicable meas-
ures of value.  I did not argue—circularly—that the mere existence of
preemptive federal legislation proves that the values reflected in such
legislation are objectively valid or that federal legislation necessarily
increases social welfare.  Instead, I argued that our constitutional deci-
sionmaking structure shifts to opponents of existing federal environ-
mental laws a substantial burden of proving that these laws do not re-
flect proper values and thus decrease social welfare.13
More fundamentally, I claimed that we invariably choose which
group of citizens’ collective values to use as the metric when evalu-
ating the social-welfare effects of federal legislation.  In other words,
we must determine whether issues should be considered matters of
national or of local concern.  We normally resolve these political dis-
7. Revesz, supra note 1, at 561-62.
8. Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 232 n.18.
9. Revesz, supra note 1, at 561.
10. See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 232.
11. Revesz, supra note 1, at 561-62.  Given the context, I assume that Professor Revesz has
not ignored the fact that many federal laws do not expressly preempt state law or contain sav-
ings provisions.
12. Id. at 562.
13. See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 250 (“Opponents of existing federal environmental laws
thus face a substantial normative burden to demonstrate that federal law is no longer war-
ranted.  They must convince the representatives of a supermajority of the public that federal
legislation imposes values that are not now shared by most of their constituents or that are ob-
jectively bad.”) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
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putes regarding the proper jurisdiction to specify values by enacting
or repealing preemptive federal legislation.14
B.  Independent Measures of Value
Further, I did provide two independent measures to evaluate
whether federal environmental regulation is justified.  These are (1)
empirical evidence regarding twenty-five years of implementing the
federal Clean Air Act and (2) self-reported public opinions (polling
data) that federal regulation is desirable. This evidence could support
the continued existence of preemptive federal environmental regula-
tion, based on its historic stability and consistent public appeal.  Nev-
ertheless, I explained why this evidence creates interpretive disputes
that typically are resolved through national judicial and political
processes.15
The starting point for my analysis, moreover, was my rejection of
Professor Revesz’s preferred metric of value, the willingness of indi-
viduals to pay for regulation.16  That metric—willingness-to-pay—is
based on liberal political theory and is the traditional tool of econo-
mists.17  As I pointed out, we cannot directly measure such willing-
ness-to-pay, because economic markets do not exist in which indi-
viduals pay regulators to regulate.18  I also noted that we could not
reliably estimate the social welfare effects of regulation based on
willingness-to-pay and cost-benefit analyses, because (1) markets do
not exist in which prices are set for many of the goods or services
produced by environmental regulation and (2) consumers’ economic
choices are often rejected as irrational.19
I therefore argued that individuals’ preferences for regulation
invariably are aggregated informally and weighed in national political
processes that enact or repeal preemptive federal legislation.20 I did
not mean to suggest, however, that these processes properly aggre-
gate citizens preferences or that enacted legislation reflects objective
values.  I thus distinguished national evaluative norms from “national
values”—which I defined as informal “aggregations based on the
preferences of all federal citizens”—and pointed out three reasons
14. See id. at 232 & n.19.
15. See id. at 235 & n.30, 291-317.
16. See id., at 231, 240-42; Revesz, supra note 1, at 562-63.
17. See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 231 n.16, 240 n.53.
18. See id. at 240 & n.54.
19. See id. at 231 & n.17, 241 & nn.55-58.
20. See id. at 241-42 & nn.59-61, 247 & nn.79-80.
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why they might not be coextensive.21  I do not believe that Professor
Revesz would dispute these points, even if he would dispute the in-
dependent measures of value that I provided to assess whether fed-
eral environmental regulation is justified.
II.  SPECIFIC CHALLENGES TO MY ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Professor Revesz poses three specific challenges to my analysis
of the traditional rationales for federal environmental regulation.
First, he rejects as empirically unsupported and intuitively unlikely
my argument that federal regulation is justified to prevent ideologic
externalities.  Second, he suggests that I would not accept my own
analysis if it were to result in preemptive federal maximum standards.
Third, he claims that my arguments do not support the pervasive
level of federal environmental regulation.  I respond to each chal-
lenge in turn.
A.  Valuing Ideological Externalities
First, Professor Revesz criticizes my argument that allowing
states to tailor regulatory requirements to local preferences may de-
crease social welfare, because citizens may derive substantial ideo-
logical benefits (positive externalities) from protecting the citizens of
other states.22  Specifically, he claims that I “do not attempt to sup-
port [my] hypothesis with any empirical evidence . . . .  One could, of
course, be asked a question of the following sort: ‘How much would
you be willing to pay to reduce the probability that someone in an-
other state whom you have never met would face an increase in the
probability of getting cancer from exposure to an environmental con-
taminant from one in a hundred thousand to one in a million’.  My
uneducated hunch is that the value given in answer to this question
would not be very high.”23
I find this criticism perplexing.  His criticism wholly ignores my
express rejection of willingness-to-pay as a proper metric for value,
21. Id. at 243.  First, many federal “citizens” are routinely deprived of a vote, and preemp-
tive federal legislation may be enacted with the support of as little as thirty-one percent of the
national electorate.  See id. at 243 n.62,  248 n.81.  Second, I expressly stated that my theoretical
analysis assumed away the “public choice” criticism that legislators do not always promote the
interests of their constituents.  See id. at 239-40 & n.51.  Third, citizen preferences may change
over time, so that the “national evaluative norms” reflected in federal legislation may no longer
reflect “national values.”  See id. at 313-15.
22. See id. at 266-73.
23. Revesz, supra note 1, at 562-63.
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and my repeated statements that we lack any good means to measure
whether the public’s self-reported opinions regarding the desire for
regulation are honestly and intelligently held.24  Further, I provided
evidence that many federal environmental laws were enacted to cod-
ify perceived moral rights to minimum levels of environmental qual-
ity, without regard to cost.25  But even if Professor Revesz’s
“uneducated hunch” were correct, the aggregated benefits of satisfy-
ing such small preferences could still outweigh the aggregated bur-
dens of avoiding federal regulation, and thus preemptive federal leg-
islation could still increase social welfare.26
Consider, for example, the federal Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“Superfund”),
which allows federal, state, and tribal trustees to bring claims for
natural resource damages caused by releases of hazardous sub-
stances.27  The Superfund law provides these claims without regard to
whether the state could recover under state law or whether federal
trust resources are involved.  Significantly, “contingent valuations” of
damage to even unexceptional and relatively unknown natural re-
sources can quickly rise to many millions of dollars when aggregated
across the entire nation’s population.28  For precisely this reason, aca-
demics debate whether contingent valuation methods are valid
(whether people honestly and intelligently believe what they report)
and legislators debate whether to limit recoveries in natural resource
damage cases.29
24. See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 313.
25. See id. at 293 & nn.249-50, 294 & n.255.
26. Each citizen would derive benefit from protecting citizens in many other states, but
only the citizens living in states that are protected more than they desire would bear the bur-
dens.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1995).
28. See Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural
Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1029,
1035 & nn. 20-22 (1995).  See generally Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42
VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989) (describing methods of and problems with valuing natural re-
sources).
29. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW 219, 222 (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995); Gordon J. Johnson, Paying the Piper: Comments on Liability
for Natural Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 265, 281-90 (1996); Super-
fund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997, S. 8, 105th Cong. Title VII (1997); Superfund Accel-
eration, Fairness, and Efficiency Act, H.R. 2727, 105th Cong. Title VI (1997).  See generally
Binger et al., supra note 28, at 1031 n.8, 1032 n.9 (citing sources evaluating or criticizing the use
of contingent valuation).
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My own “uneducated hunch” is that American citizens attach
substantial importance to protecting the welfare of citizens of other
states whom they have never met.30  However, it is difficult to distin-
guish among individuals’ desires: (1) to benefit others by imposing
regulatory protections; (2) to further economic self-interest by sub-
jecting others to competitive economic burdens; or (3) to harm others
by imposing regulatory burdens.31  I know of no good way to distin-
guish which of these concerns was a proximate cause of preemptive
federal legislation.  But I did provide examples of federal laws for
which many of these concerns likely played a significant role.32  I also
note here that states themselves often seek federal protection, at
least to further their economic self-interest.33
B.  Preemptive Federal Maximum Standards
Second, Professor Revesz suggests that I might not accept the
implications of my ideologic externalities analysis if citizens were
more concerned with jobs and economic well-being than with the
physical environment in other states (and therefore desired to impose
federal laws preempting more stringent state environmental stan-
dards).34  In fact, I would, but I did not explicitly make this point
when discussing interstate externalities.
30. Two examples should suffice to make the point.  Individuals routinely contribute to
out-of-state and out-of-country charitable causes, donating amounts in excess of any associated
tax benefits.  Voters likely derive significant ideological benefits from preemptive federal leg-
islation that protects children, such as child pornography laws.  These voters are likely to ex-
pect that such  laws will apply principally to individuals who reside in other states.  Cf. Sarnoff,
supra note 2, at 243 n.62 (federal legislators presumably take children’s interests into account
because their constituents are concerned about children’s welfare).
31. See id. at 266-67 (discussing positive and negative economic and ideologic externali-
ties); id. at 268 & n.154 (discussing altruism, self-interest, and spite).
32. See, e.g., id. at 295-96 (discussing various rationales for provisions of the federal Clean
Air Act that prevent states and localities from allowing their air quality to deteriorate signifi-
cantly in areas meeting federal minimum ambient standards, which include moral concerns
over environmental quality and desires to competitively disadvantage citizens of other states).
33. For a recent example, many northeastern states petitioned the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to take action regarding the interstate transport of ground-level
ozone pollution.  In response, EPA recently proposed regulations to define when upwind states
“contribute significantly” to the failure of downwind states to attain national minimum air
quality standards.  Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport
of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed Nov. 7,
1997).  Presumably, most downwind states could physically achieve the national standards, so
the federal regulation of physical externalities is addressed to economic competition or to per-
ceived rights to be free from external pollution.
34. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 563.
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Instead, I made the point when discussing races-to-the-bottom
and races-to-the-top.  Specifically, I stated that interstate regulatory
competition:
may decrease social welfare if environmental compliance
costs are raised so that wage and tax losses outweigh the
public health and environmental gains … .  Critically, if the
nation is not ambivalent between the forms of welfare losses,
i.e., is selectively risk-averse to state-level value errors, then
it will have reason to impose preemptive minimum or maxi-
mum standards that limit normative diversity, or both . . . .
[I]f the nation is averse to presumably higher environmental
quality standards and presumably lower employment, it
should establish preemptive maximum standards.35
Further, I argued as an empirical matter that Americans are
more concerned with protecting the environment than they are with
obtaining the benefits of wages and taxes.  I also suggested reasons
why these preferences might change in the future, leading to preemp-
tive maximum environmental standards.36 The perceived benefits of
federal uniformity also may change and could lead to more frequent
preemption of state regulation in its entirety.37
C.  Pervasiveness of Federal Standards
Third, Professor Revesz argues that pervasive federal regulation
of “less stark” environmental risks cannot be justified, even if Ameri-
cans place a high value on protecting out-of-state citizens from
“egregiously high levels of environmental harms.”38  According to
Professor Revesz, my arguments “might justify some federal control
over minimum levels of environmental quality rather than the status
35. See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 279, 284 & n.202 (emphasis added).  Such risk-aversion
may be based on concerns for the welfare of the citizens of other states or on other concerns.
36. See id. at 284 & n.202 (“The nation’s citizens are more risk-averse to losing their lives
from pollution than from starving.  The direction of American risk-aversion may be highly ra-
tional, given the tremendous wealth of our country and (at least until recently) the relentless
expansion of the welfare state.  If we deplete our resources, our values and thus our laws may
change.”).
37. Cf. id. at 252 & n. 96.  Many analysts distinguish between regulation of products and of
processes.  See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From
the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1333-37, 1340-45 (1992).  Federal envi-
ronmental legislation frequently preempts state products regulation in order to achieve uni-
formity.  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 136v (1994) (preemption of state and local regulation of pesticide
labeling).  But federal environmental laws also preempt state regulation of processes.  See, e.g.,
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 & n.9 (1972) (holding the federal interest in uni-
formity of interstate or navigable water pollution laws preempted state nuisance laws).
38. Revesz, supra note 1, at 563.
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quo of extensive centralized regulation.”39  This is because only
“minimal levels of health ought to count as a basic human right” and
because existing federal laws either are excessive or are insufficient
to assure these minimal levels.40
Again, I find Professor Revesz’s criticism perplexing.  I argued
that pervasive federal environmental regulation—even uniform fed-
eral standards—may be justified: (1) if legal protection were not lim-
ited to “significant” transboundary harms;41 (2) as a “second-best”
regulatory strategy to address interstate pollution externalities, given
political impediments to allocating the costs of preventing such
harms;42 or (3) if existing federal laws codify moral rights to minimum
levels of environmental quality.43  One premise of my article was the
lack of agreement as to what constitute “minimal” environmental
rights, and whether “rights” are the best moral framework for re-
solving disputed environmental values.44  Further, I noted that public
opinion supports expanding federal environmental protections at
even greater costs, which suggests that existing legal rights are insuf-
ficient to protect perceived moral rights to environmental quality.45
By highlighting the under-inclusiveness of existing federal protec-
tions for “minimal levels of health,” Professor Revesz only provides
arguments to more fully federalize and more pervasively regulate all
aspects of human life.
Although I did suggest many reasons why I believe the status
quo of pervasive federal regulation is beneficial, I clearly did not sug-
gest any support for the status quo of existing federal environmental
laws, or for the implementation of federal policies by states.  I also
did not suggest that uniform standards were beneficial, but rather
that they were beneficial only if the costs of tailoring requirements to
local conditions (rather than to local preferences) outweighed the
benefits.46
Instead, I reiterated the claim that “‘[w]hile we all might agree
that the current structure of regulation produces undesirable results,
[recent academic criticism] does next to nothing to show that the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 544-45.
41. See Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 269-73.
42. See id. at 273-78.
43. See id. at 290 & n.230.
44. See id. at 288-91, 319.
45. See id. at 235 & n.30.
46. See id. at 253 & n.105, 255-57.
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source of the problem is the federalness of the regulations.’”47  Simi-
larly, I noted that federal oversight costs likely outweigh any relative
economies of scale to be obtained from state implementation, but
that this fact “does not in any way suggest that existing federal regu-
lation cannot be made more efficient.”48 Finally, in another article, I
argued that federal environmental statutes may unconstitutionally
delegate legislative powers to federal agencies and to states through
federal agencies. 49
CONCLUSION
In sum, Professor Revesz’s response to my article simply misses
the point.  Given his tremendous contributions to the field, I hope
that he will respond again to my article.  I would particularly wel-
come his thoughts on a useful approach to resolve the moral debates
over value that underlie federalism disputes.
47. Id. at 233 n.23 (quoting Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570, 637 (1996)).  See also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Risk Assessment Policy Under Su-
perfund and RCRA, in ENVIRONMENTAL DESKBOOK 1997 1 (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
1997) (criticizing EPA’s extremely conservative risk assessment policies for hazardous wastes
and hazardous substances).
48. Sarnoff, supra note 2, at 266 n.146.
49. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and
the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 (1997).
